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The optimal design of credit contracts and bankruptcy procedures is an important policy
question both in developed market economies and in countries with emerging markets. In this
paper I deal with several theoretical considerations related to these important policy problems.
My main concern is with the impact of relaxation of bankruptcy procedures providing for a
possibility of a renegotiation of the debt instead of strictly imposing bankruptcy whenever the
debtor falls into a default on his debt. I deal with this problem in a context of collateralized
debt contracts in the conditions of imperfect information about the prospects of the entrepre-
neur and about the results of his project.
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1. Introduction
This paper has two goals. One is to analyze the commitment problem in collateralized
debt contracts under asymmetric information. The other is to contribute to the discussion of
the soft budget constraint (SBC) problem in transition economies. These goals are interrelated
since commitment to imposing liquidation on non-performing firms is a key aspect of harde-
ning the budget constraint. This paper shows that the view from the SBC literature that hard-
ness is „good“ and softness „bad“ is questionable. Renegotiation and debt forgiveness in some
cases improve welfare relative to liquidation of the defaulting firm. This is true despite the
cheating and lower financial discipline created by the soft approach of creditors to enforcing
credit contracts.
This paper presents a simple incomplete contract model of a credit market with ex ante
asymmetric information and ex post costly state verification. I consider an entrepreneur who
has private knowledge about his probability of success and who borrows from a lender in or-
der to undertake a risky project. The borrower is able to pledge collateral to secure his loan.
After the realization of the outcome of the investment project there is ex post asymmetric in-
formation between the borrower and the lender, who is not able to observe the project’s out-
come. The lender is able to observe it only if he imposes costly bankruptcy on the borrower. I
compare the hard budget constraint situation when the lender is committed to imposing ban-
kruptcy upon the borrower’s announcement of default with the SBC situation where the len-
der may renegotiate the debt.
The fact that the outcome of the investment project is costlessly observable only by the
entrepreneur leads to a possible ex post moral hazard and enforcement problem. The success-
ful borrower may either repay his debt or falsely report failure of the investment project. One
possible way to solve this problem is to collateralize the project fully with outside collateral.
In the case where the borrower does not have sufficient wealth to pledge as outside collateral,
the payment incentives have to be provided by a different arrangement. A widely used enfor-
cement mechanism is to allow the lender to impose bankruptcy on the defaulting entrepreneur
and to take over the project.
The resolution of the situation following a default by a borrower is a subject of many
debtor–credit laws. The most well known is the US Bankruptcy Code which covers two basic
types of bankruptcy proceedings. Firms that enter liquidation under Chapter 7 of the US Ban-
kruptcy Code are typically shut down and their assets are dispersed under the control of the
bankruptcy trustee (the liquidator) who represents the creditors. Under Chapter 11, firms re-
organize as going concerns under the control of their management, protected from their cre-
ditors and able to operate. The US Bankruptcy Code provides creditors with basic protection
against borrowers who would hide the project’s revenue and refuse to pay the lender. At the2
same time it is very much concerned with protecting a bankrupt firm’s going-concern value
while it is in bankruptcy and with minimizing inefficiencies caused by liquidation of the de-
faulted firm.
The fact that many countries are currently modifying their bankruptcy laws towards the
US Bankruptcy Code could be taken as an indirect indication of the revealed success of the
US debtor-oriented-approach. Nevertheless the legal norms used in a developed market eco-
nomy with a strong legal culture may not be the best to use in a developing or transition
country. Maskin and Xu (2001)  argue that Chapter 11 has given rise to soft budget constraint
(SBC) problems. They also review some proposals for reforming Chapter 11 bankruptcy pro-
cedures and suggest that more theoretical analysis should be done in this area.
The literature on transition economies has frequently stressed the hardening of the firm’s
budget constraint as a necessary condition for a successful transition to a market economy.
The implementation of strict bankruptcy procedures was viewed as an essential element of
this hardening of the budget constraint. A prime example of a tough approach to bankruptcy is
the Hungarian automatic bankruptcy trigger experiment.
In September 1991 the Hungarian Parliament passed a major change of the Bankruptcy
Act which introduced an automatic trigger on bankruptcies. This provision required the ma-
nagers of firms which held overdue debts of any size to any creditor to initiate bankruptcy
proceedings to avoid prosecution under the civil code. The introduction of the compulsory
bankruptcy proceedings led to a sharp increase in the number of bankruptcies in Hungary.
Kornai (2002)  reports that the number of bankruptcy filings per firm reached 24 percent in
Hungary in 1992. This is a quite high rate since Claessens and Klapper (2002)  show that for
their world-wide sample of 37 countries the corresponding average rate was between 0.02
percent (Spain) and 8 percent (Sweden) with the majority of countries having this rate in the 1
to 4 percent range. The Hungarian automatic bankruptcy trigger improved the state of pay-
ment discipline, overcame creditor passivity, and hardened the budget constraint of Hungarian
firms. As argued by Bonin and Schaffer (2002)  the high efficiency costs of forced bankrupt-
cies led to the abolishment of the automatic trigger in September 1993.
Based on the Hungarian experience, June 1996’s amendment to the Czech Bankruptcy
Act added a requirement that the debtor has to file for bankruptcy if he is overdebted. As op-
posed to Hungarian case there was not specified any criminal liability for failure to comply
with this requirement in the Czech law. This was changed in 2000 when the criminal penalty
of up to three years in prison was instituted for a manager of a defaulted enterprise who does
not file for bankruptcy. The announcement of this civil law penalty led to a lot of discussion
in the business community in the Czech Republic. In May 2000 The Prague Post  newspaper
wrote „ ‘There is nothing like Chapter 11 [of the U.S. Bankruptcy Acts] in the Czech Econo-
my, ’ said Weston Stacey, executive director of the American Chamber of Commerce. ‘Now
bankruptcy means liquidation and going out of business.’ “ Nevertheless in July 2001 Janosik
and Lizal  concluded that „Criminal and financial sanctions (liability) for negligence in re-
spect of the breach of the obligation (managerial duties of statutory bodies) to file for the ban-
kruptcy, when required to do so by the Bankruptcy Act, are not yet fully known and obeyed.
... The solution is to really start to prosecute the legally responsible management for criminal
behavior.“ Lizal (2002)  reports that as of January 2002 no one has been held responsible for
not filing.
These stylized facts about the use of the automatic bankruptcy trigger versus allowing for
debt renegotiation and forgiveness serve as a motivation for my model in which I compare
credit contracts with soft (lender is not committed to initiate bankruptcy upon default) and
hard (bankruptcy automatically follows the default) bankruptcy procedures. My model contri-3
butes to the literature on the soft budget constraint (SBC), which was started by Kornai (1979,
1980)  and subsequently developed by Schaffer (1989)  and Dewatripont and Maskin (1995).
While Kornai, Maskin, and Roland (2003)  discuss different approaches and interpretations of
SBC, I will follow Maskin and Xu (2001)  in treating SBC as a financial commitment pro-
blem of not imposing bankruptcy on the defaulted entrepreneur.
Dewatripont and Maskin (1995)  consider a case in which only an entrepreneur knows
the quality of his project and the lender does not have any instruments through which he
would be able to screen the projects. In my analysis I allow for the inclusion of outside colla-
teral as a screening instrument. I extend the SBC model of Dewatripont and Maskin (1995)
by connecting the standard adverse selection model of collateralized debt as described by
Schmidt-Mohr (1997) with the debt renegotiation models of Bester (1994), Scheepens (1995),
Choe (1998),  Khalil and Parigi (1998),  Boyer (2001),  and Menichini and Simmons (2003).
I show how the introduction of ex ante asymmetric information influences results obtained
under an assumption of ex ante symmetric information and how ex post costly state verificati-
on interacts with the sorting role of collateral in the incentive compatibility problem of adver-
se selection.
My model is close to the simplest version of the Dewatripont and Maskin (1995)  SBC
model, as presented by Kornai, Maskin, and Roland (2003),  because I do not allow for any
exertion of effort by lender or borrower which would influence the outcome of the project.
Some of my results could also be compared with the results obtained by Bester (1994)  who
has only one type of borrower in his model and who does not include in his model the adverse
selection effect of the ex ante asymmetric information. He repeatedly emphasizes that the
results of his model are conditional on ex ante symmetric information and he conjectures that
when the entrepreneur knows more about the project’s ex ante profitability than the creditor,
the results of the model might change significantly and the renegotiation may in fact be harm-
ful. I will show, that in my setup the renegotiation under adverse selection increases welfare.
My model also provides a qualification for Bester’s (1994) conjecture that renegotiation may
seriously undermine the role of collateral as a screening device.
My model allows me to consider collateral both as a signaling instrument and as a factor
determining the likelihood of bankruptcy. I show that the screening effect of collateral pre-
vails but that the major qualitative result of a welfare-enhancing role of renegotiation survives
the introduction of the ex ante asymmetric information into the model. My explicit analysis of
the interaction between credit renegotiation and the screening role of the collateral brings in
this way a new contribution to an extensive literature dealing with adverse selection models of
the credit market in general as summarized by Schmidt-Mohr (1997)  and with the use of
collateral in particular as documented in a survey by Coco (2000). To my knowledge, my
model is the first attempt to model together adverse selection with costly state verification and
renegotiation in the presence of collateralized debt contracts.
The rest of this paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 introduces my model.
The situation under the commitment to the original contract is analyzed in the section 3. The
commitment assumption is relaxed in the section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2.  The Model
I consider a risk neutral entrepreneur who wants to undertake a project. The project is
either a failure, with return  X   normalized to  1 X =  , or a success with the return  XX =  . The
return  X   includes the market value of the productive assets used in the project evaluated at
the time of the conclusion of the project. This means in particular that the failure return can be
interpreted as a scrap value of the assets used in the process which are legally attachable. The4
project requires an investment  (1 ) I X ∈, . The entrepreneur can be either of type L or type
H . The probability of a success depends on the type of entrepreneur. It is 0 1 LH pp <<<  for
a „low“ and a „high“ type respectively. This is the only difference between these two types.
The entrepreneur has a collateralizable wealth W  consisting of the assets which would
normally not be legally attachable and he borrows the investment finance I  from a risk neut-
ral lender. The lender does not know the type of the borrower and the lender does not observe
the return realization of the project. He learns the return realization only if he imposes ban-
kruptcy upon a borrower and takes over the project. When the lender takes over the project or
the outside collateral CW ≤ , his valuation of these is  X α   and  C α , respectively, where
01 α << . I assume that the expected foreclosure value of the project exceeds the investment
cost for both types of borrower:
(1 ) , { } ii p Xp I i L H α +− > ∈ , . (1)
I also assume that in the case of a project failure the lender cannot recover the loan  I
even when he takes over both project and collateral and the cost of taking over are negligible,
that is  1 α → :
1 IW >+ . (2)
As a lower bound on the available collateralizable outside wealth W  I assume that it is
higher than the value of the failed project when taken over by the lender. That is, I assume
W α >. (3)
The debt contract () R C ,  requires the borrower to pay the amount of R  upon a completi-
on of the project. The assumption (2) implies that  1 R > . I also assume that R X ≤  since the
borrower would never be able to pay more than the successful return of the project. If the bor-
rower does not pay R  the lender has a right to force the borrower into a bankruptcy. Ban-
kruptcy means that the lender takes over the project and the collateral C . Instead of forcing
the borrower into bankruptcy the lender can renegotiate the contract after the borrower an-
nounces the failure of the project. If the project really failed the lender would maximize his
payoff by making a renegotiated offer of (1 ) C , .
I model this situation through the following game. There are many lenders and one bor-
rower. A borrower knows his type (L or  ) H , but a lender only knows that the probability of
type  L is θ . Lenders compete by offering contracts () R C , . Each lender also has the option
of not making an offer, which guarantees him a zero profit. If the borrower does not accept
any contract, the game ends and everybody gets a zero payoff. If the borrower accepts one
contract, the borrower and his lender play the following subgame.
In the first stage of this subgame the project is realized either as a success or as a failure.
This realization is observed by the borrower but remains unknown to the lender.
In the second stage only the successful entrepreneurs can pay R  as 1 R X <≤. Thus after
observing failure outcome of the project, the borrower has to default. In the case of success
the borrower has two choices. Either pay R  or to claim that the project failed and default. The
borrower can choose the mixed strategy according to which he defaults with probability
01 d ≤≤  and pays R  with probability 1 d − . In the case of repayment the game ends with
payoffs  XR −  for the borrower and  R I −  for the lender. In the case of default the subgame
continues to the third stage.
In the third stage after observing default the lender either imposes bankruptcy or offers a
renegotiated contract (1 ) C , . The lender can randomize by imposing bankruptcy with the pro-
bability 01 b ≤≤ . When bankruptcy happens, the lender takes over the project with the payoff5
being  () XC I α +−  or  (1 ) CI α +−  according to the realization of the project. The borrower’s
payoff is  C − . By renegotiating the contract the lender gets payoff 1 CI α +−  and the borro-
wer gets  1 XC −−  if the project was a success or  C −  if the project was a failure.
I assume that the lender and borrower do not have verifiable random device available.
This means that it is not possible for them to write a contract which would specify a (nontri-
vial) probability with which a lender would impose bankruptcy on defaulting borrower. As a
result of this assumption the initial contract is incomplete.
3.  Credit Contract without Renegotiation
When the lender is committed not to renegotiate and automatically impose bankruptcy on
the defaulting borrower, I have a standard model of screening in a credit market.
The expected utility of a borrower of a type i is
() ( 1 ) ii i i i Up X R p C =− − −. (4)
The expected profit of a lender from a separating contract with a borrower of a type i is
(1 ) (1 ) iN R i i i i p RpC I ρα , =+ − + − . (5)




and the proportion θ  of low type borrowers is high enough so that the indifference curve
of the high type borrower through his equilibrium contract does not intersect the pooling zero
profit line.
Under these assumptions the separating contracts form the unique separating equilibrium
of the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) type.










α −− . This implies that the zero profit line of a low type borro-
wer is steeper than the zero profit line of a high type borrower and that it has a higher inter-







This means that the indifference lines of a low type borrower are steeper than those of a
high type borrower and that the indifference lines are steeper than the zero profit line for each
type of borrower.
Under these conditions the low type obtains in the equilibrium his complete information
contract. The equilibrium contract of the high type is given by a binding incentive compatibi-
lity constraint of a low type.














The values of repayment and collateral at the equilibrium separating contracts are provi-
ded in the following theorem.
Proposition 1.  The equilibrium solution is given by the following separating contracts:













for a low type borrower and
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for a high type borrower.
Proof. The lender’s maximization problem is
() max (1 )
LLHH
LH RCR C M UU θθ
,,, =+ −
[( ) ( 1 )] LL L L p XR p C θ =− − −
(1 )[ ( ) (1 ) ] HH H H p XR pC θ +− − −− (12)
subject to
() ( 1 )() ( 1 ) ii i i i j i j p XR p C p XR p C −− − ≥ −− − (13)
0 i U ≥ (14)
(1 ) (1 ) ii i i p RpC I α +− + = (15)
0 i CW ≤≤ , (16)
where  {} ij LH ,∈ , .
I consider a case in which collateralizable wealth W  is sufficiently high to cover required
collateral. That is I assume that there always exists feasible value of W  which is higher than
the equilibrium collateral  iN R C
∗
, . I also assume that incentive compatibility condition (13) for
high type and individual rationality conditions (14) for both types are satisfied in the equilib-
rium. I check these assumptions after I obtain the solution of the less restricted optimization
problem.
Given these assumptions I substitute for








from lender’s zero profit condition (15), do some algebraic simplification and form the
following Lagrangian
() max [ (1 ) (1 )(1 ) ]
(1 )[ (1 ) (1 )(1 ) ]
{[ ( 1 ) ( 1 ) ]
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−− − −− −
++ .
Kuhn-Tucker conditions are FOC
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∂
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∂
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∂7
0 H τ += (18)
and incentive compatibility condition for low type of borrower ( ) L IC , 0 i C ≥ , comple-
mentary slackness conditions and nonnegativity of multipliers.
First I show that  0 L C = . Suppose by contradiction that  0 L C > . Complementary slackne-
ss then implies  0 L τ = . FOC (17) then implies (1 )(1 )( ) 0 LH pp αθ µ −−+ = , which is a contra-
diction. Therefore  0 0 LL C τ =, > .
Next I show that  0 H C > . Suppose by contradiction that  0 H C = . Then ( ) L IC  implies
() ( ) 0 HL pp I α −− − ≥ , which is a contradiction. Therefore  0 0 HH C τ >, =.
Finally I show that ( ) L IC  is binding. Suppose by contradiction that ( ) L IC  is not binding.
Then by complementary slackness  0 µ = . FOC (18) then implies (1 )(1 )(1 ) 0 H p θα −− − = ,
which is a contradiction. Therefore ( ) L IC  is binding. The solution of the less constrained pro-
blem is then given by  0 L C = ,  H C  obtained from binding ( ) L IC  and  i R  obtained from len-
ders’ zero profit conditions.
As a last step I check that the solution to the less constrained problem in fact satisfies the
additional conditions I assumed to hold when I formed the Lagrangian. The expected utility of
a low type borrower is
(1 ) LL L Up X p I α =+ −− .
The assumption (1) guarantees that  0 L U > . The expected utility of a high type borrower
is
H U = (1 ) HH H H H p Xp R p C −− −
                                  = (1 ) (1 )(1 ) HH H H p XI p p C αα −+ − −− − .
Rewrite (1 ) HH H p Xp X p X αα =+ −  and obtain
[1 ] ( 1 ) [( 1 ) ] HH H H H H Up X p I p Xp C αα =+ − − + − − −.
Since by assumption (2)  1 H CW I << − ,
[1 ] ( 1 ) [( 1 ) ( 1 ) ] HH H H H Up X p I p Xp I αα >+ − − + − − − −
[1 ] ( 1 ) [1( 1 ) ] HH HH H p Xp I p Xp p I αα = + − −+− + − −− . (19)
Since the right hand side of (19) is positive by assumption (1), the individual rationality
condition of high type borrower is satisfied.
The incentive compatibility condition of high type borrower is
(1 ) (1 ) 0 HH H H H HH L H L pX pR p C pX pR p C −− − − ++ − ≥ . (20)
The left hand side of (20) is equal to8
2
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This proves that the incentive compatibility condition of high type borrower is satisfied.
Q.E.D.
The equation (10) immediately implies that the required collateral increases with the size
of the project I . The increase in the efficiency α  leads nonambiguously to lower repayment
LN R R
∗
,  of the low type borrower and it also has direct negative effect on the high type borro-
wer’s repayment  HN R R
∗
, . There is also indirect effect through collateral requirement  HN R C
∗
, .
Differentiating  HN R C
∗
,  with respect to α  shows that increase in efficiency α  leads to higher












As long as intuitively plausible relation of higher use of collateral with the decrease of
the deadweight loss of collateral transfer 1 α −  holds true, the restrictions on the size of col-
lateralizable wealth W  (2) and (6) are mutually consistent for any α .
In the equilibrium only high type of a borrower posts collateral. As common in this type
of credit market models, which do not allow for renegotiation, the collateral serves only as a
screening instrument for separating the safer borrower from the more risky borrower. Since
the probability of success of the high type borrower is lower than one, there will be unsuc-
cessful collateralized projects in the equilibrium despite the fact that the low type borrower
does not pledge any collateral. The share of collateralized failed projects in all failed projects
is
(1 )(1 )











For some values of the parameters it could even happen that the majority of failed pro-
jects would be collateralized. This would happen if the proportion of low type borrowers were








−+ − < . This restriction is consistent with the lower bound on
θ  given by (7) as long as the deadweight cost of bankruptcy and ownership transfer are low









While the borrower with a low probability of success obtains the same outcome as under
complete information, the good borrower with the high probability of success is harmed by a
presence of a bad borrower. In the next section I investigate whether relaxing the full com-
mitment assumption can improve the situation of the good borrower. I also answer the questi-
on of the possibility of a Pareto improvement through renegotiation.
4.  Credit Contract with Renegotiation9
I will assume that the credit contract at the first part of the game achieved the separation
of the low and high type of the borrower. Then I analyze the subgame following the signing
of the contract using the fact that the type of borrower was already revealed by his acceptance
of the separating contract. Then I go back and I show that the optimal contract at the first part
of the game was indeed the separating one. Because of assumption (2), I consider only re-
payments  i R  satisfying 1 i WRX +<<.
The subgame following the signing of contract can be solved using a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium. The Bayesian updating requires that conditional on default the lender believes










If the lender never imposes bankruptcy after the entrepreneur’s default, then the borrower
always declares default. On the other hand, if the lender always imposes bankruptcy on de-
faulted entrepreneur, then the successful entrepreneur never defaults. This leaves a possibility
of an equilibrium where both players use mixing strategy. However, if the probability of a
successful outcome is relatively low or the costs of bankruptcy are relatively high, then the
lender might impose bankruptcy only with small probability or not even bother to initiate
bankruptcy proceedings because the expected gains from detecting false default may not
compensate the costs of bankruptcy. In that case the successful entrepreneur in equilibrium
would always default. However the proof of the following lemma shows that such equilibria
would not satisfy the assumption (1). This means that the unique equilibrium will indeed be in
mixed strategies.




























This equilibrium of the signaling subgame is unique.
Proof.
I consider first the borrower’s problem. When the project is successful, the borrower ma-
ximizes his expected utility
max (1 )( ) [ (1 )( 1 )]
i
Bii i i i i i d Ud X R d b C b X C =− − + − +− − − .
After some simplifications this leads to
'1 ( 1 ) Bi i i UR C b X =− −− − ,
where  B U ' is a derivative of  B U  with respect to  i d . Therefore
0i f 1 ( 1 )
[0 1] if 1 ( 1)





dR C b X
RC b X
=< + + − 
∈, =+ + − 
 => + + − . 
Next I consider the lender’s problem. When he observes the default, the sequential ratio-
nality requires him to maximize his expected utility10
max { [ ( ) ] (1 )(1 )}
(1 ){ [ (1 ) ] (1 )(1 )}
i
Li i i i i b
ii i i i




=+ − + − + −
+− + − +− + − .
After some simplifications this leads to
'( 1 ) ( 1 ) Li UX απ α =− − − ,


































I will consider separately all three cases for possible values of  i π  and  i b .
Case 1  
1








ii d R C
∂
∂ =− + . Because
1 R W >+ , the sequential rationality of the borrower requires  1 i d = . Then according










This is equivalent to
(1 ) 1 ii pX p α +− <,
which is a contradiction.
Case 2  
1








ii d R XC
∂
∂ =− + . Because R X < ,
the sequential rationality of the borrower requires  0 i d = . Then according to (23)
0 i π = , which is a contradiction.
Case 3  
1





Case 3.1   0 i d = : Then by (23)  0 i π = , which is a contradiction.
Case 3.2   1 i d = : Then by (23)  ii p π =  and consequently 
1




− = . This
is equivalent to  ( 1 ) 1 ii pX p α +− =,  which is a contradiction.







Since 1 i WRX +<< the lender’s strategy  i b  satisfies  (0 1) i b ∈,. Finally (23)
and 
1
















The equilibrium values of mixing probabilities  i d  and  i b  imply the following results,
which I summarize in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2.
1.  An increase in the collateral requirement and a decrease in the contractual re-
payment lead to a lower probability of bankruptcy.11
2.  The higher the deadweight cost of a transfer of collateral or ownership of the
project, the higher a probability that a successful entrepreneur will default.
3.  Higher value of a successful outcome decreases the probability that the success-
ful entrepreneur will default.
4.  The share of defaulting successful entrepreneurs is higher for borrowers with ex
ante lower probability of success.
Proof. It follows from Lemma 1.
Using the solution of the renegotiation subgame obtained in Lemma 1, I solve for the
equilibrium contracts in the screening game.
Given the equilibrium probability of default  i d , the lender’s profit from the separating
contract to a type i borrower is
(1 ) ( 1 )(1 ) iR i i i i i i i p dR p d p C I ρα , = −++ −+− . (26)
Similarly as in the case without a renegotiation, the zero profit line of a low type is stee-
per and has a higher intercept than the zero profit line of a high type.
The comparison of the slopes of indifference lines and a zero profit line for a borrower of
a type i shows that the indifference lines are steeper if the probability of success is suffici-








By assumption (1) this condition is automatically satisfied as long as the investment cost
is sufficiently higher than the investment return in the failure state, that is if  1 I α >+ . Given
the restriction (2) on the minimal size of the investment cost, it follows that the condition (27)
is automatically satisfied when W α > . This is satisfied by assumption (3).
Given the condition (27) which states that the probabilities of success will be sufficiently
high for both types, the relative positions of indifference lines and zero profit lines determine
a separating equilibrium. In this equilibrium the low type gets his most preferred contract on
the low type zero profit line and the high type’s contract is determined by a binding incentive
constraint for a low type. The values of equilibrium repayment and collateral are provided in
the following Proposition.
Proposition 3.
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for a high type borrower.
Proof.
The lender’s maximization problem is
() max (1 )
LLHH
LH RCR C M UU θθ
,,, =+ −
[( ) ( 1 )] LL L L p XR p C θ =− − −
(1 )[ ( ) (1 ) ] HH H H p XR pC θ +− − −− (32)
subject to
() ( 1 )() ( 1 ) ii i i i j i j p XR p C p XR p C −− − ≥ −− − (33)
0 i U ≥ (34)
(1 ) ( 1 )(1 ) ii i i i i i p dR p d p C I α −++ −+= (35)
0 i CW ≤≤ , (36)
where  {} ij LH ,∈ , .
I consider a case in which collateralizable wealth W  is sufficiently high to cover required
collateral. That is I assume that there always exists feasible value of W  which is higher than
the equilibrium collateral  iR C
∗
, . I also assume that incentive compatibility condition (33) for
high type and individual rationality conditions (34) for both types are satisfied in the equilib-
rium. I check these assumptions after I obtain the solution of the less restricted optimization
problem.
I substitute for  i d , express the repayment  i R  from lender’s zero profit condition
2 ( 1 ) ( 1) (1 ) ( 1) (1 )
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and substitute it in  i U
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=− − .
−+ − −+ −
Since the assumptions (1)–(3) imply that  ( 1) 1 0 i pX α −− >, I see that increase in collate-
ral  i C  indeed decreases utility of borrower as I would intuitively expect.
I also substitute for  i R  in the incentive compatibility condition of low type borrower
() L IC  and I express ( ) L IC  as
22
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Now I form the Lagrangian13
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(1 ) ( 1 ) ( 1 )
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Kuhn-Tucker conditions are FOC
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(38)
and incentive compatibility condition for low type of borrower ( ) L IC , 0 i C ≥ , comple-
mentary slackness conditions and nonnegativity of multipliers.
First I show that  0 L C = . Suppose by contradiction that  0 L C > . Complementary slackne-
ss then implies  0 L τ = . FOC (37) then implies
2 (1 )(1 )[ ( 1) 1] (1 )( 1)
(1 ) 0
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This simplifies as













which is a contradiction.
Next I show that  0 H C > . Suppose by contradiction that  0 H C = . Then ( ) L IC  implies
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After a tedious algebra this can by simplified as14
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which is a contradiction. Therefore  0 0 HH C τ >, =.
Finally I show that ( ) L IC  is binding. Suppose by contradiction that ( ) L IC  is not binding.
Then by complementary slackness  0 µ = . FOC (38) then implies













which is a contradiction. Therefore ( ) L IC  is binding. The solution of the less constrained
problem is then given by  0 L C = ,  H C  obtained from binding ( ) L IC  and  i R  obtained from
lenders’ zero profit conditions.
As a next step I check that the solution to the less constrained problem in fact satisfies
the additional conditions I assumed to hold when I formed the Lagrangian. The expected uti-
lity of a low type borrower is
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I rewrite (1 ) XI α −  as (1 ) XXX I α −+−  and I obtain
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The incentive compatibility constraint of high type borrower ( ) H IC  is
() ( 1 ) 0 HL H HH pR R pC −− − ≥ . (39)





















This means that ( ) H IC  is satisfied if and only if  0 LH RR −≥ .  After substitution for  L R
and  H R  I get
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It is enough to show that the difference of the first two right-hand-side terms in equation
(13) is positive. After some simplifications I obtain15
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Therefore ( ) H IC  is satisfied.
As a last step I show that the expected utility of a high type borrower
() ( 1 ) HH H H H Up X R p C =− − −
is positive. The positive expected utility of a low type borrower implies that  L XR > .
Therefore it is enough to prove that
() ( 1 ) 0 HL H HH pR R pC −− − ≥ . (41)
Since the (41) is the ( ) H IC  as expressed in (39), I proved that  0 H U > . Q.E.D.
In the case when the success probability for a low type or for both types would be lower
than the critical value given by a condition (27), which is implied by assumptions (1) - (3), the
separating contracts given by equations (28)-(31) would no longer be optimal. The equilibri-
um contract would be in this case a pooling contract in which both types of borrower have to
provide the maximum available amount of collateral CW = . The interest rate is then deter-
mined by a lender’s pooling zero profit line:
2 [ ( 1)(1 )] (1 )( 1)
[( 1 ) ] 1 [( 1 ) ] 1
LH LH
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where (1 ) LH L H p pp θθ =+ − .
In the case of a success probability for both types being lower than the critical value gi-
ven by a condition (27), this pooling equilibrium always exists. This is guaranteed by the fol-
lowing relations between indifference and zero profit lines. A high type indifference line is
flatter than the pooling zero profit line, which precludes a profitable pooling deviation. A low
type indifference line is flatter than the slope of a low type zero profit line, which precludes a
profitable separating deviation for a low type.
When only a low type has a lower-than-critical probability of success, the pooling equili-
brium exists as long as the probability θ  of the low type is sufficiently high such that the high
type indifference line is flatter than the pooling zero profit line. Due to the fact that the bin-
ding zero profit lines are in this case determined by pooled probabilities of success, these lines
move closer to the pooling zero profit line than under the separating equilibrium. For a pa-
thological case of W  close to zero and  L p  only slightly lower than the critical value (27), the
nonexistence of an equilibrium caused by a separating deviation of a low type could arise .
Following this clarification of what could happen if the assumptions (1 - 3) implying a
condition (27) were not satisfied, I will restrict my further attention to the cases satisfying
these assumptions.
The proportion of collateralized defaulted projects on the total number of defaulted pro-
jects will be the same as in the case with a commitment. This is because the probability of
announcing a default for a borrower of a type i is 
(1 )
1 1( 1 )
X













− >  measures the increase in the probability of default due to a strategic default.
The ratio of collateralized defaults on the total number of defaults is then equal to this ratio in
the commitment case, which is given by an expression (22).
Instead of focusing on defaults, I may consider actually imposed bankruptcies instead. In
this case the probability of imposing a bankruptcy on a borrower of a type i is16
(1 ) ii i i bdp p +− . This means that the ratio of collateralized bankruptcies on the total number
of bankruptcies is
(1 )(1 )














Since in equilibrium  LH bb > , the comparison of expressions (22) and (42) shows that the
share of collateralized bankruptcies on all bankruptcies is lower than the share of collaterali-
zed defaults on all defaults.
Since the probability of default is a decreasing function of the successful project outcome
X , the equilibrium contract depends on the value of the successful outcome. In particular, it
can be shown that without commitment the equilibrium repayment  LR R
∗
,  of a low type borro-
wer is a decreasing function of the value of successful outcome  X . This is different from the
situation without a renegotiation when the value of successful outcome does not influence the
equilibrium size of a collateral and repayment.
The main result on the welfare consequences of relaxing the commitment assumption in
my model follows now.
Proposition 4.  The possibility of renegotiation increases welfare.
Proof. The expected utility of the lender is both with and without commitment determi-
ned by a binding zero profit condition. Therefore the welfare comparison depends on the ex-
pected utilities of both types of borrower. Suppose that renegotiation does not increase welfa-
re. Therefore at least one type of borrower obtains in the commitment case greater utility than
in the renegotiation case or both types of borrower obtain in the commitment case greater or
equal utility than in the renegotiation case. This implies that in the renegotiation case there
exists an equilibrium of the Bayesian subgame following the signing of contract in which the
lender plays a pure strategy of imposing bankruptcy whenever the borrower announces de-
fault. This contradicts the uniqueness of non-degenerate mixing strategy established in Lem-
ma 1. Q.E.D.
My conclusion that renegotiation increases welfare is consistent with the results of Bes-
ter’s (1994) costly state verification model. On the other hand Scheepens (1995) provides an
extension of Bester’s model in which he shows that the renegotiation may decrease the entre-
preneur’s welfare. Scheepens assumes in his model that the bankruptcy court performs an
imperfect stochastic test of whether the borrower is able to fulfill his debt payment. In the
case the borrower is found guilty of cheating he is punished by a nonpecuniary penalty. If this
penalty is not sufficiently high then the possibility of renegotiation decreases the entrepre-
neur’s payoff as compared to the commitment case.
The influence of renegotiation on the size of collateral required of the high type borrower
is in general ambiguous in my model. This happens because for the very low success proba-
bilities the collateral required with the renegotiation is higher than without renegotiation while
for other parameter values it is lower.
In particular,
1
(1 ){ [ (1 )] }
lim( ) 0
[( 1 ) ] 1 H
LL












My results could be compared to the results of Bester (1994), who analyzes the renegoti-
ation with ex ante symmetric information. Under the restriction corresponding to my assump-
tion (27) of sufficiently high probabilities of success he concludes that neither of the borro-
wers provides collateral and the repayment is given by a lender’s zero profit condition.17
5.  Conclusions
In this paper I have analyzed an adverse selection model in a credit market with the
possibility of renegotiation. I have provided a possible explanation for widespread softness of
the budget constraint in the case of defaulting entrepreneurs. I have shown that the inclusion
of the possibility of renegotiation increases welfare since the utility of the lender remains the
same and the utilities of both types of borrowers increase. This means that when the lender
and borrower are not able to write and enforce complete contracts allowing for randomization,
the soft budget constraint is welfare enhancing. I have also shown that renegotiation does not
preclude the use of collateral as a screening device when the lender and the borrower have ex
ante asymmetric information about the chances of success of the intended investment project.
My model of SBC features a positive probability of willful default by a successful entre-
preneur in equilibrium. This possibility is not considered by Kornai, Maskin and Ro-
land (2003),  but it is consistent with empirical studies of banking in transition and developing
countries by Dietz, McNaughton and Carlson (1992)  and Brixi et al. (2001).
Since the probability of default in the model with renegotiation is a decreasing function
of the successful project outcome  X , I obtain the intuitively plausible result that the equilib-
rium contract depends on the value of the successful outcome. This is different from the situ-
ation of pure adverse selection without renegotiation when the value of the successful outco-
me does not influence the equilibrium collateral and repayment requirements.
My result of a welfare increase by relaxing the commitment of the lender to impose ban-
kruptcy on the defaulting entrepreneur supports the theoretical argument provided by Mano-
ve, Padilla and Pagano (2001) in favor of more lenient bankruptcy procedures. They show in
their model of collateral and project screening that the strict enforcement of bankruptcy de-
creases the efficiency of the credit market. This is consistent with my welfare results. My re-
sults also provide additional theoretical support to the empirical studies by Schaffer (1998)
and Bonin and Schaffer (2002).  They argue that the strict imposition of bankruptcies on de-
faulting entrepreneurs is not a good way to improve the efficiency of credit markets in transi-
tion economies. While my central motivating example was a SBC problem in the transition
economies, I have to note that the problem of SBC and commitment in credit contracts in ge-
neral is relevant to emerging markets, developing economies and developed markets econo-
mies too.
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